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AND COMMENT

~s llY h1PI.ICATION-PR0Hm1T10N IN MxcmGA'N.-At the November
election of_ 1916 the people of the state of Michigan ratified the following
amendment to the constitution of that state: "The ~ufacture, sale, giving
away, !Jartering or furnishing of any vinous, malt, brewed, fennented, spiritous or intoxicating liquors, except for medicinal, mechanical, chemical, scientific or sacramental purposes shall be after April thirty, nineteen hundred
eighteen, prohibited in the State forever. The Legislature shall by law provide regulations for the sale of such liquors for medicinal, mechanical, chemical, scientific and sacramental purposes."
As is known by every resident of Michigan and as may be s11rmised by
parties outside, the adoption of the amendment was preceded by a great deal
of discussion, not always free from acrimony. And the debates did not cease
with the election, for at the forthcoming session of the legislature the necessary legislation to carry the amendment into effect was to be considered.
There were "bone dry" advocates, there were supporters of a liberal policy,
and there were propone~ts of various intermediate schemes. Every intelligent follower of public events in Michigan knew full well that for a long
time it was questionable as to what plan would be adopted by the legislature,
and more than one· bill was introduced and considered.
On May 2, 1917, there received the approval of the Governor Act No.
161 called commonly the Damon Act, which provided in Sec. 1, that "It shall
· be unlawful for any person to bring or carry into or receive or possess within
this State any vinous, malt, brewed, fermented, spirituous or intoxicating li-
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quors except for medicinal, mechanical, chemical, scientific or sacramental purposes." Section 2 provided that ..All laws ot this State pertaining to search
for, seizure of, and complaints, warrants and proceedings relative to such
liquors shall be appiicable under this Act," etc. By Section 4 it was provided
that "l\.ny person who, himself or by his clerk, agent or employee, shall violate * * * this act, shall be deemed guilty of a. misdemeanor", etc. Section
6 of the Act declared that "The provisions of this act shall take effect and be
in force on and after May one, nineteen hundred eighteen."
This act might properly be called a "bone-dry" act, and obviously its passage by the legislature was a victory for the advocates of that sort of measure.
At the time this act was passed there was pending in the legislature another bill which was enacted into law, the approval of the Governor bearing
date of May 10, 1917. This Act, No. 338, known as the Wiley Act, was entitled "An Act to prohibit the manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, giving away,
bartering or furnishing any vinous,*** liquors", etc. By Section 2 of
this act it is made "unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, himself or
by his clerk, agent or employe, to manufacture, sell or keep for sale, give
away, barter, furnish or otherwise disp,ose of any vinous * * * liquors." The
Wiley Act consist~ of sixty-one sections obviously designed effectively to pro·
bibit the manufacture sale, etc., of intoxicating liquors, except for medicinal,
etc., purposes; to regulate the manufacture, sale and possession thereof for
such excented purposes ; to provide for enforcement and penalties for violations; to prohibit certain advertising-; to prescnoe the duties of officers and
carriers; to prescribe rights of action; and to appeal all acts in contlict therewith. The sixty-first section provided that the "provisions of this act shall
take effect and be in force on and after May first, nineteen hundred ~ighteen."
It should be observed that this latter act makes it unlawful to mans1facture,
sell or keep f-0r sali:, give away, barter, furnish or otherwise dispose of intoxicating liquors, while the Damon Act covered the bringing and carrving into
the state, the receivi11g and possessing of intoxicating liquors; that the two
acts were passed by the same legislature and approved less than ten days
apart; and that !?<>th were to be effective according to their terms on May 1,
1918.
On August 1, 1918, officers, without a warrant, entered the premises of one
Marxhausen, searched for and seized a large quantity of intoxicating liquors,
some in the· dwelling house. 'The liquors so seized were conveyed to the
county building, and shortly thereafter a complaint was filed charging Marxhausen with a violation of the so-called Damon Act, above referred to. The
Supreme Court, upholding the trial court, held (1) that the search and seizure
was unlawful and that the beverages should be returned to their owner and
(2) that the Wiley A.ct had supers~ded and repealed by implication the Damon
Act, so the information was rightly quashed. The People of the State of
Michigan v. Mar.-rlzausen, decided February, 1919.
·
The court was convinced that the legislative intent was that the Wiley Act
shoi1ld cover the entire field of liquor legislation. To the argument that that
act was obviously designed to prohibit the merchandizing of liquor while the
Damon Act applied to personal use, the court replied by pointing out that
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the latter was not limited to prohibition of personal use, for Section 4 of
that act provides: "Any person who, himself or by his clerk, agent, or employe
shall violate any of the provisions of this act," etc. "Clearly", said the court,
"if the legislature by the Damon Act solely designed to prohibit and prevent
the personal use of intoxicating liquors there would be no occasion to use the
words Clerk, Agent, or Employee. The use of these words in the fourth section of the act, the penal section, eliminates the argument that the Damon
Act was designed to cover and apply only to a field not contemplated by the
Wiley Act." In this conclusion the court failed to attend to the words of
the Damon Act. Section I, as pointed out above, made it unlawful "to bring
or carry into or receive or possess within this State" any liquors. .It must
be perfectly obvious that at least the "bringing'' and "carrying" into the state
might be by "agent" or "employee" or even by a "Clerk." The use of the
last word perhaps affords some basis for a view that merchandizing was covered l>y the Damon Act. It is, however, a very slender foundation for a con-·
chtsion that the two acts covered the same field.
The court quotes from and cites a number of cases establishing the un-·
doubtedly sound rule as expressed in Shannon v.·People, 5 Mich. 85, "That
where a subsequent statute covers the whole ground occupied by an earlier
statute, it repeals by implication the former statute, though there be no repugnance.'' This rule· is applicable, however, only when the later statute
"covers the whole gr-0und". That the ·Wiley Act did not bear such relation
to the Damon Act would seem clear upon the most casual reading. Further
and more careful reading and reflection serves only to strengthen such conclusion. That the seven judges present (OsTRANDl':R, J., was absent)-the
report of the case states that it was "before the full bench"-should have·
agreed in the conclusion is remarkable.
The part of the opinion dealing with the question of search and seizure ·
complained of is an able and thorough consideration of the question of unreasonable searches and seizures-.
R. W. A.
TH~ "SouRci;: OF LAW" JN TH~ PANAMA CAN.AI, ZoNI':.-A case just decided in the Supreme Court of the United States, coming to that court from·
the Canal Zone, shows the great difficulties under which our courts labor when
they are called on to interpret and administer tlie"law in our extra-continental
possessions. The courts have apparently had the most difficulty in amalgamating the Roman law and the common law in cases involving questions of
delictual liability. In the case of Fernandez v. Perez (rgo6), 202 U. S. Bo,
the procedural question was presented as to the validity of an action on the
case for the wrongful levy of an attachment brought in the United States
District Court for the District of Porto Rico. A decision of the point involved a discussion of the relation of torts to crimes in the Spanish law~
Such a discussion was presented in 6 MICH. L. REv. 136, 149, (1907).
In Panama Railroad Company, Plaintiff in Error v. Theodore Bosse, U. S.
Sup. Ct. March 3, 1919, the plaintiff in the lower court had been injured by ·
a motor omnibus, negligently driven by a chauffeur of the Panama Railroad
Company at an excessive rate of speed through a crowded street in the
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Canal Zone. Suit was brought in the District Court of the Canal Zone. The
defendant argued, (I) that the common law liability of the master for his
servant could not be applied to this accident in the Canal Zone, (2) that there
can be no recovery for physical pain. The lower court 1decided for the plaintiff on both these points, and this decision was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court.
Using "source" in the sense of the instrumentality through whicli or the
persons by whom the rule of law is formulated, there are several questions.
that naturally arise as to the "source of the law'' of this case; namely, is it
found in the law of the old jurisdiction of Columbia or Panama, illJ the common law, in an amalgamation of the two, or, finally, may the law have come
from some other source? If the lower court had requested a brief from
counsel as to what the Panama law was on the doctrine of respo11deat supe-·
rior, that question might have been settled at the beginning of the litigation,
and, at the final hearing, the Supreme Court would not ha\'.e been reduced to
clever guessing .as to the meaning of the several articles of the Civil Code
which deal with compensation for losses by illegal act.
An executive order of the President of the United States, issued on March
8, 19041 had said, "The law of the land, with which the inhabitants are familiar. * -* * will continue in. force in the Canal Zone." This was construed
to keep in force the Civil Code of the Republic of Panama, ~d it was argued
that the Civil Code as construed ~- civil· law countries "does not sanction
the application of the rule of respondeat superior to the present case". It
would seem that the phrase "with which the inhabitants are familiar" ought
to apply to those who inhabited the Panama Zone at the time of the issuance
of the President's order: i.e., in March, 1904. and not, as the Supreme Court
suggests, to the inhabitants at the present time who are "only * * * the employees of the Canal, the Panama Railroad, and the steamship lines and oil
companies permitted to do business in the Zone under license." The present
inhabitants are, as the court says, familiar with the. common law rule, but
the suggestion that the President's order applies to such !Jnhabitants and not
to those natives dwelling there in 1904. when the Zone w;is first taken over,
adds to rather than decreases our bewilderment as to the relation of the com.mon. law rule to the civiflaw provisions.
In the absence' of any enlightenment from counsel in the case as to the
·actual character of the civil law on the point, the Supreme Court attempts to
show that Articles 2341, 2347 and 2349 of the Panama Civil Code are, at least,
not necessarily out of harmony with the common law doctrine of rcspondeat
s11perior,·and concludes that, "it would be a sacrifice of substance to form if
we should reverse the decision." And further, "we are by no means sure that
they (the -native Courts) would not have decided as we decide." But, "at all
events" (italics not the <;ourt's) "we are of the opinion that the ruling was
correct." In regard to the second point the opinion concludes with the
statement· that, "it cannot be said with certainty that the Supreme Court of
the Zone was wrong in holding that under the Civil Code damages ought to
he allowed for physical pain. Fitzpatrick v. Panama Railroad Co., 2 Canal
Zone Sup. Ct. Rep. III, 129, 130."
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The decision is certainly a wise one and it commends itself as in accordance with the well-established principies of the common law, but it leaves us
just where the District Court of the Canal Zone started so far as concerns
a definite answer to the questions above suggested. As a decision of our
court of last resort it makes perfectly good law and the decision in the Court
of the Canal Zone has already been followed as a useful precedent in the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals. Cf. Panama Railroad Co. v. Toppin,
250 Fed. Rep. !)89, but it is submitted that if the Courts of the Canal Zone
could have determined at the beginning under what law they were acting, not
every case varying in some details from the instant case on its facts would
have to be carried to the Supreme Court of the United States for determination, and incidentally the perfectly innocent desire of the theorists might be
gratified by the determination of whether the "source of the law" is ~he Modern Roman Law of Columbia or Panama, the Common Law of England or
the good old doctrine of Cicero that "lex nihil alitld nisi recta et a numine
deormn tracta ratio, jubens honesta prohibe11s contraria''.
It would seem that in this instance also the rule of the survival of the
fittest in law is operating. Where the common law has come into conflict
with the Spanish-Roman or Dutch-Roman law in the English or American
dependencies the principles of the former have generally supplanted that of
·the latter. The English doctrine of "consideration" has proved superior to
the modern Roman law doctrine of "cause"· in Louisiana· and Cape Colony,
Soutl1 Africa. 4 M1cH. L. Rm'. 19, Cf. 20 LAW Qu.AR'l'. Ritv. 349. In the
instant case also the common law principle is victorious, although we are not
quite certain whether it has won because it was identical with the civil law
principle or because the case was finally determined by our Supreme Court.
'It should be noted also that this victory of the common law is in the field of
private law, not of public law, and thus seems out of harmo~y with Taylor's
generalization (Cf. "Tn Scn:N~ OJ? JURISPRUD£Ncs'', p. xy), accord~ng ~o
which there is arising a composite law in these localities of mixed j urisdi.::tion "whose outer shell is English public law,
and whose interior code
is Roman private law."
J. H. D.

***

PAT£NT LAw-S£CR£T Us£ AS Afn:CTING RIGHT TO A PAT£NT.-An unusually obvious piece of judicial legislation, of practical importance to the manufacturing world, was promulgated in the case of Macbeth-Evans Glass Co.
v. General Electric Co., 246 Fed. 695. The facts were that in 1903 Macb.eth
had invented a process for making glass. Since that time the plaintiff company, of which Macbeth was president, had been using that process. This
use had, however, been "secret''. In 1910 an employee of the plaintiff revealed the process to the Jefferson Glass Co., which l)t once began to use it,
but on application of the Macbeth Co. the state court enjoined the Jefferson
Co. from further use of .the process and from disclosing it to others. Macbeth-E'l>!lns Glass C<>. v. Schnelbach, 239 Pa. 76. The secret of the process
was not revealed by the proceedings in this suit. It does not appear how
the General Electric Co. acquired knowledge of the process; whether it did
learn the secret of the Macbeth.process, or evolved a similar process by its
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own independent efforts. Macbeth applied for a patent in 1913 and when
it was issued the Macbeth Co., as his assignee, brought this suit for infringement. The General Electric Co. defended on the ground that Macbeth had
lost his right to a patent, by his failure to apply ~or one reasonably 'soon after
he had perfected his invention, and that, consequently, the patent issued to
him was void.
The statutes provide that the first and original inventor may obtain a patent upon application, unless his invention has· been in public use or on sale
more than two years prior to his application, or Jlnless he is proved to have
aba_ndoned the invention. R. S. 4886. These are the only exceptions stated.
Macbeth was conceded to be the first and original inventor. It was admitted
also that the invention had never been sold-although its products had been.
. Macbeth was obviously not proved to have abandoned his invention. On the
contrary he was using it, and displayed a very vital interest in it. "The constant effort made to preserve the secret was inconsistent 'vith intent to abandon the invention".
The court might have held that the so-called secret use of the invention
by the Macbeth Co. for the ten years preceding the application was in fact
a public use. This would have had the authority of Perkins v. Nassua Card
Co., 2 Fed. 451. In that case the invention was used in a factory employing
a score of worlonen, all of whom· had keys to the building, and to which
visitors were occasionally admitted.. ·This was held to be a public use, such
as would preclude the inventor from a patent, because "when the public have
had means of knowledge they have had knowledge of the invention." So
also, in Egg'liert v. Lippmann, 104 U. S. 333, the invention of a type of corsetsteel was held to have been in "public use" without further evidence than that
the inventor's wife wore a pair of corsets containing such steels. (Compare
also Jenner v. Bowen, 139 Fed. 556.) But the court did not choose to adopt
this solution of the case. On the contrary, it' was expressly assumed that the
use of the invention had been a secret use. Still more convincingly might
the court have held that the use by the Jefferson Co. and by the General
Electric Co. was truly a public use. Neither the consent of the inventor
(Andrews v. Hovey, 123 U. S. 267, 124 U. S. 6g4) nor the extent of the use
(Swain v. Holyoke Mach. Co., 109 Fed. 154) is material in the question of
public use. But this simple solution also the court ignored. The case was
deliberately made to tum upon the issue of "whether one who has discovered
and pei;-fected an invention can employ it secretly more than nine years for
'purposes only of profit, and then, upon encountering difficulty in preserving
his secret, rightfully secure a patent."
Since .the right to a patent had not been forfeited through public use nor
abandonment of the invention, it must have been lost, if at all, in some other
way. .As the statute expressly mentions these two causes of forfeiture and
no others, it might be supposed that only these were intended as causes of
forfeiture; the maxim e~pressio unius might be supposed to apply. Even
more indubitably might it he supposed that the emphasis placed on public use
by the statute would preclude loss of right through secret use. ·The decisions
prior to the one under ~isc9ssion did proc~ed upon: this supposition. Neither
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secret use nor public knowledge has been held a cause of forfeiture. Thus,
in Bates v. Coe, g8 U. S. 31, 46, the court said, as a basis for rejecting certain
evidence, "Inventors may if they can, keep their invention secret; and if they
do for any length of time, they do not forfeit their right to apply for a patent,
unless another in the mean time has made the invention and secured by patent the exclusive right to make, use and vend the patented improvement.
Within that rule and subject to that condition, inventors may delay to apply
for a patent." In Parks v. Booth, 102 U. S. ¢, 105, the same judge repeated,
"Inventors may, if they can, keep their inventions secret; but if they do not,
and suffer the same to go into public use for a period exceeding what is
allowed by the Patent Act, they forfeit their right to a patent." So also, in
Eggbert v. Lippmam~. supra, Mr. Justice MILL~, dissenting from the finding
that a certain use had in fact been public, makes the apparently undisputed
statement, that "the word public is therefore, an important member of the
sentence" and a secret use will not preclude a patent. In Eliabeth v. Paving
Cc., 97 U. S. 126, 136, it was held that not only was the word public important, but "use" was equally so, and that·mere public knowledge of the invention, though for more than two years prior to the application would not affect
the patent. There n:iust, the court said, explicitly, be a use by the public
before the court can imply either an abandonment of the invention or a. loss
of the right to a patent. The only authority in any way opposed to this interpretation is dictum. In Kendall v. Winsor, 21 How. 322, for instance, the
decision was ill favor of the patentee, but the court did say that one "may
forfeit his- rights as an inventor * * * by an attempt to withhold the benefit
of his improvement from the public 1mtil a similar or the same improvement
shall have been made and introduced by others". (Present writer's italic5.)
There is no evidence whatsoever in the Macbeth case that the invention was
ever made by anyone but Macbeth.
Most of this authority was considered in the principal case. It was not
overruled, but was declared somehow to accord with the proposition that a
thoroughly secret, non-public use, without any proof of abandonm~t of the
invention may deprive the inventor of his statutory right to a patent Freed
from restriction of this authority the court took the position that it would be
out of accord with sound public policy to allow an inventor to maintain a
virtual monopoly of his device by using it in secret for a number of years,
and then to acquire a statutory monopoly for a longer period. Accordingly,
the court read into the statute a provision that the right of a first and original
inventor to a patent will be forfeited by secret use for purposes of profit.
This interpretative legislation is quite in analogous accord with the decisions
by which it has been settled that, as between rival applicants for a patent,
the "first and original inventor" is not the one who first invented the de\'ice,
but the one who first reduced t.1ie device to actual practice. Automatic T¥eighfog Mach. Co. v. Pneumatic Scale Co., 166 Fed. 288; One-Piece Lens Co. v.
Bisiglzt Co., 246 Fed. 450. As the decision was virtually affirmed by the Supreme Court in refusing a writ of certiorari, 246 U. S. 659, and was cited with
approval in E. W. Bliss Co. v. Southern Can Co., 251 Fed. 903, 907, it will
probably stand as t~e proper interpretation of the statute.
J. B. W.
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CoRPORA'l.'lONS, SHAI!SHOLDERS' RIGH'J.' 'tO liA'Vl': A DIVIDl'!ND Dr:CLARSD AND
PAID Ou'!.' o'l!' SURPLus.-In Dodge v. F()rd M()tor Co. (Mich. r919), 170,
N. W. 668, the questions were not new, arid with one exception, the decision
was not unusual, but the sums involved were enormous. The Motor Company was incorporated in 1903, under the general manufacturing incorporating
act of Michigan (P.A. .232, 1903), for the manufacture and sale of automo.biles, motors and devices incident to their construction and operation, with
an authorized Capital Stock of $150,ooo-$100,000 then paid up, $49,000 in
cash, $4o,ooo in letters patent issued and applied for, and ·$u,ooo in machinery
and contracts. In lgo8 the stock was increased to $2,000,000 by the declaration of a stock dividend of $1,900,000. Plaintiffs own one-tenth of the stock.
By July 31, 1916, the Company had sold lt272,986 cars at a profit of $173,B9SA16; it had paid regular dividends of s% monthly, 60% or. $1,200,000 per
annum on its capital stock of $2,000,000, and in addition had paid special dividends of $1,000,000 in l9II; $4,000,000 in 1912; $10,000,000 in 1913; $n,ooo,ooo in 1914; and $15,000,000 in 1915-$41,000,000 in five years. It had also
accumulated a: surplus in excess of Capital Stock of $14,745,095 in 1912; $28,124,173 in 1913; $48,829,032 in 1914; $59,135,770 in 1915; and $n1,g6o,907 in
1916. Its assets were $132,oSS,219; and liabilities, other than Capital Stock
·and surplus, $18,127,312.
The selling price of the car was ·originally fixed at $900.oo, but a policy of
_annually reducing this had been carried out until the price of $44o per car
had been reached in 1914- This price was continued for the year 1915 in
.order to accumulate a larger surplus with which greatly to enlarge the Company's plant, and various investments for this purpose were made during the
year. Approximately 500,000 were sold this year at the $440 price, and a net
profit of nearly $6o,ooo,ooo made. The directors then proposed. tc> reduce the
price to $36o per car, although there was a greater demand at the former
price than the Company could supply, and it was practically c~rtain 6oo,o00
cars, mid with a like profit, rould be sold during the year at the fonn-er price;
in which case the new price would cut the net profits some $48,000,000.
Plans were perfected in 1915-1916, and were about to be carried out for
substantially doubling the manufacturing plant at an estimated cost of $9,895,000 for buildings, $51 150,000 for equipment, and $n,325,ooo for the construction of a smelter plant to make the iron used in the construction of the
cars, the evidence showing that if this was done, the cost of the iron per car
could be reduced about fifty per cent.
Plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin the carrying out of these projects, and to
have a dividend of 50% of the accumulated profits declared and paid to shareholders. They contended:-(1) That the statute limiting the amount of Capital Stock with which a manufacturing company could be incorporated to
$50,000,000 made it unlawful for a corporation to accumulate from profits,
and use in its business, more than $50,000,000, and the balance over that must
be distnouted to shareholders. (2) That the building and operation of the
smelter would be ultra 'Vires. (3) That the reduction of the price of the
car would make competition by others impossible, and thereby creiite a monopoly contrary to the anti-trust act; and, (4) That a failure to distribute a
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large part of the surplus as a dividend to shareholders, by the directors, was
a breach of duty on their part.
The trial court held with the plaintiffs upon propositions (1), (2), and
(4), and ordered the distribution of one-half of the surplus (after deducting
the dividends already declared), as a special dividend to the shareholders,
amounting to $19,275,385. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court upon
all these propositions except (4), and held there was no monopoly created
contrary to the Anti-trust Law as alleged in proposition (3). In ruling as
the Supreme Court did upon the first three propositions, it followed substantially all the authority there is.
In affirming the decree of the lower court.on proposition (4), the court relied mainly upon facts which showed clearly that more cars could be sold at
the price of $440 than the Company could make, and that Mr. Ford exercised
a dominating influence over the business and had confessedly adopted an attitude toward the shareholders that, having already received great gains, they
should be content with them or their continuance; that the profits were too
large; and that by a reduction in the price, these profits should be shared
with the public.
The court says, Os'l'JL\NDJ":R, C. J., "A business corporation is organized
primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for that end: The discretion of directors is to be exercised
in the cl1oice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a change
in the end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the non-distribution of
profits among shareholders in order to devote them to other purposes." "It
is not within the lawful powers of 'a board of directors to shape and conduct
the affairs of a corporation for the merely incidental beneilt of shareholders,
and for the primary purpose of ben~ting others." All the judges concurred
in~~~
RL~

STARJt Di;:cisrs-LIABn.ITY bF MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS FOR ToRT.--Courts
are charged with the duty of declaring the law. They are also required to
decide cases. Either one of those functions might be performed with comparative ease if it were divorced from the 6ther, but when the court is simultaneously obliged to do both, the difficulties are very apparent. To decide
a case and at the same time to declare the law means that the court is required to generalize every legal proposition upon which it acts in making its
decision. But judges are not omniscient. Who can so fully understand the
logical implications and the latent possibilities of any rule of law that he can
safely announce it as a perpetual guide for the future? This the judges are
nevertheless expected to do, for if the law is to be available and certain, its
rules must not only be fully formulated but consistently adhered to. 1'he
rule of stare decisis is a necessary judicial protection extended to the people.
But it is very obvious that the rule cannot be applied rigidly if the law is
to keep pace with society as it changes its ideas of legal relations. More or
less departure from precedent is constant and inevitable. The common law
has for cent~ries effected such changes by "distinguishing" those cases which
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ought not to be governed by the canonized rule. In some cases the courts
frankly announce their dissent from the old rule and state a new one. But
more frequently they accomplish the same result by "distinguishing'' the case
before them from the case which announced the precedent. This preserves
the appearance of consistency, and at the same time introduces a "variable"
into the operation of the rule while preserving the rule itself with whatever
value it may possess. In this way the rule- is "administered" with a view to
keeping its good features and eliminating its bad ones. Within limits the
courts are thus able to accomplish the useful and difficult task of shooting
so as to "hit it if it is a bear and miss it if it is ti cow".
No rule has been "distinguished" away in more cases than the rule that
cities are not liable for torts arising otit of the performance of governmental
functions. An interesting case has just been decided in Iowa. The city of
Sioux City purchased an automobile for its police department. One day the
authorized driver of the car was using it under the orders of his superior
to· haul pqlicemen to their beats in' different parts of the city, and he negligently caused it to run into the car in which plaintiff's testate v;as riding,
resulting in her death. The court conceded the general rule and then successfully avoided its effect by holding thaf the hauling of policemen to their
beats in an automobile was not necessary for the enforcement of peace and
order, but was only a convenience for the policemen; therefore the act was
not governmental but corporate, and the city was liable. Jones v. Siou~ City
(Iowa, 1919), 170 N. W. 445. ·
The process of "distinguishing'' as a substitute for overruling is one which
can be carried-too far. At most it is a provisional evolutionary process, which
ought· to be eventually followed by a restatement of the rule itself. If this
··is not done the law becomes a 'mass of special instances buried in a jungle
of specious argument and logical subtilty'. The "distinguishing'' process should
only serve as a means for approximating the true rule. Employed for that
purpose it preserves to the common law the vital -element of adaptability
which' ha~ always kept Anglo-Saxon legal conceptions responsive to the needs
~fa 'constantly changing social order.
·
·
· In the instance here referred to, it might be asked whether the distinguishing process was not carried far enough to justify the court which announced the decision in restating the rule in the interests of a broader justice.
The maritime law, which is operative in our country concurrently with the
common law, has been held to require no such limitation on municipal liability as that here referred to. If a New York City fire-boat negligently rams a
vessel while going to a fire, the city is liable for the damage, while a New
York city fire-engine can negligently smash every vehicle on the street with
perfect impunity.-Workman v. New York Cit:,•, 179 U. S. 552. And if a
Chicago city fire-boat while throwing water on a burning elevator carelessly
allows the spray to damage a neighboring vessel, the city is liable, although
if· the water came from a ·fire-hydrant on shore the owner of the property
injured by it would be without a remedy. City of Chicago v. White Transportation Co., 243 Fed. 358, affirmed November 5, 1917, 245 U. S. 660.
In the Workman Case, supra, the Court, speaking through Justice WHITS,
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emphasizes the wrong and injustice which would result from a rule exempting
a municipal owner of a fire-boat from answering in damages for injuries negligently done to privat~ property, and confesses an unwillingness to countenance "the evil consequences growing from thus implanting in the maritime
law the doctrine that wrong can be done with impunity". This revolt against
the common law rule was vigorously assailed by four of the nine judges of
the court in a long opinion based squarely on the.doctrine of "stare decisis''.
But when the Chicago Case came up, seventeen years later, there was no
effort made to reopen the question.
Legislation is "inadequate as a corrective for the rule of stare decisis, and
the conrts should doubtless be constantly alive to the necessity of keeping
the law flexible and also unencumbered with an unnecessary cloud of distinctions.
E. R. S.

